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New Parity Thesis

One goal in this chapter is to suggest and explore a new parity
thesis in terms of its appeal to holistic principles, Reid's credulity
disposition, and the theistic nonlawlike externalism introduced
briefly earlier. A second goal is to consider two potential rejoinders
to the position developed here. In Sections 1-3 I concentrate on the
first goal; in Sections 4-6 I deal with the second.
1.

Interpersonal Practice and the New Parity Thesis

Many of the concerns uncovered in the discussion to this point
grow out of two issues. The first is that according to both PTA and
PT� epistemic parity exists between theistic beliefs that are about
an epistemically unique, spatiotemporally nonrooted individual
God-and beliefs about epistemically unique but spatiotemporally
rooted things. The second issue is the confirmation ofjustified be
liefs. Just what constitutes confirmation, what role does it play in
justification, and do theistic beliefs have it?
Taking these in order, the first issue suggests that perhaps a suc
cessful parity thesis is to be found in beliefs that parallel one an
other more closely-in a comparison between beliefs about God
understood as an epistemically unique, spatiotemporally nonrooted
individual and beliefs about other individual entities akin to God in
just that way, that is, epistemically unique and spatiotemporally
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nonrooted. Humans fit the bill here, and something to which Al
ston alludes can help us get started in our thinking about a new
parity thesis. In wondering whether there is some way CP
"proves" itself, as PP does with all its "payoffs in terms of predic
tion and control of the course of events," Alston calls attention to
another epistemic practice:
interpersonal perception, our awareness of other persons as persons.
There is controversy over whether to regard this as an autonomous
practice or simply as a department of perceptual practice, but I shall
adopt the former view. That is, I shall suppose that we have a prac
tice of objectifying certain ranges of our experience in terms of the
presence, condition, characteristics, and activities of other persons,
and that this practice can no more be justified from the outside than
any of the others we have been considering. It is, in a way, inter
mediate between PP and CP. In particular . . . its internal self-justi
fication is not so purely in terms of predictive efficacy as is PP. To
be sure, by perceiving what we do of other persons we are thereby
enabled to anticipate their behavior to some extent, and this is of
pragmatic value. But persons are notoriously less predictable than
things, and the value of this practice for our lives is not restricted to
that payoff. To compensate for this relative unpredictability there is
the possibility of entering into communication, fellowship, compe
tition, and so on with other persons. And, most basically, that is
what this practice enables us to do.'

Alston notes that this practice is intermediate between CP and
PP. He does not say in detail exactly in what regard this is true. He
would, I am sure, include the fact that persons are less predictable
than things and that God is even less predictable than we humans.
But I believe there is another important distinction to which Alston
does not call attention but toward which I have been aiming. The
practice through which we generate Christian theistic beliefs is a
practice that has, as its central focus, a single epistemically unique
spatiotemporally nonrooted individual-God, and his desires,
thoughts, and actions. God is the only member of his kind. Inter
personal perception does not have as its focus the solitary member
of a kind. Here I wish to distinguish between interpersonal percep
tion, as the practice through which we generate beliefs about perr.

Alston, " C hristian Experience and Christian Belief, " pp. 1 3 1-32.
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sons qua persons, and another practice through which we generate
beliefs about persons qua epistemically unique individuals. Alston's
discussions do not make such a distinction, but it is precisely this
failure that leaves his position open to the background belief chal
lenge. The practices that generate beliefs about individuals qua
epistemically unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individuals re
quire background beliefs for the formation of their deliverances,
and thus all such practices are noninferential mediated practices (or
perhaps, if some are inferential, then simply mediated).
As Alston notes, there is debate about whether interpersonal
perception is an independent practice or a subpractice of PP. Like
that, one might debate the existence of independent practices that
generate beliefs about epistemically unique objects and suggest that
they are subpractices of broader practices. So, for example, the
practice that allows us to come to know Tom versus Tim, and Jack
versus Tom, and so forth, is really a subpractice of interpersonal
perception, the practice that allows us to generate beliefs about
persons qua persons. I treat them as independent practices.
I suggest that some of the practices that generate beliefs about
individual things qua epistemically unique spatiotemporally non
rooted individuals are on the same level as CP. These practices are
more parallel to CP than they are to PP. Let us call the practice that
allows us to generate beliefs about persons qua persons "interper
sonal perceptual practice" and the practice that allows us to gener
ate beliefs about persons qua epistemically unique individual per
sons "unique person practice. " What kind of beliefs does
interpersonal perceptual practice generate? Interpersonal perceptual
practice is closer, I think, to religious practice than to PP. Whereas
PP gives us fairly clear and specific sortal beliefs-that thing is a
tree, for example-religious practice does not. Religious practice's
deliverances, recall, are somewhat vague and general recognitions
of a reality beyond the physical and the (humanly) personal. Inter
personal perceptual practice, I suggest, gives us (more or less) gen
eral beliefs about the realm of the humanly personal. It is interper
sonal perceptual practice that allows us to recognize that we are in
the company of personal beings rather than merely physical things.
It is a difficult practice to describe, or to individuate, for we almost
always engage in unique person practice when we engage in inter
personal perceptual practice. Whenever we form beliefs about per-
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sons based on experience, we pick out individual persons (either by
proper names, indexicals, or unique descriptions) and not just the
reality of the personal. Nevertheless, our ability to pick out the
personal from the nonpersonal seems necessary for us to pick out
the individual person. 2
Given this distinction between unique person practice and inter
personal perceptual practice, and continuing with Alston's concern
with rationality, a new parity thesis can be suggested:
Parity ThesisNew (PTN): Under appropriate conditions,
engaging in CP and engaging in unique person practice
have, for S, the same level and strength of overall ratio
nality.
There is no extension to beliefs, for overall rationality, as we have
been using the term, is a metaepistemological notion applicable
only to the evaluation of practices.
Why suggest parity only between CP and unique person practice
and not either unique physical object practice or memory beliefs
about epistemically unique things? In the latter case, as I indicated
earlier (Chapter 9, Section 2), memory beliefs are formed by a con
ceptual-reading practice. There appears to be no parallel to unique
person practice or CP. Although we do have memory beliefs about
epistemically unique individuals, it is not clear that they are gener
ated or justified in a way different from memories about anything
else. Perhaps this is because the kind of experiences attached to
memory beliefs is always internal to the rememberer. 3 As to the
former, it seems to me that, because of the regularity of physical
objects and the intimate connection between this regularity and the
spatiotemporal nature of these objects, a practice for the generation
and justification of beliefs about unique physical objects is best un
derstood as a subpractice of PP. Unique physical object practice
turns out, thus, to be a conceptual-reading practice. The identifica
tion of epistemically unique physical objects seems to rely in im2. Consider a young child's ability to tell the difference between a stuffed, grey

toy cat and a real grey cat-or science fictional androids who are supposedly con
scious or alive and the confusion this engenders for legal cases against the androids.
3 . Plantinga has some interesting comments about the role of experience in
memory; see Warrant and Proper Function, Chapter 3 .
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portant ways on the spatiotemporal web that is part and parcel of
the world picture of PP, as well as on the predictive nature of PP.
Another way to state this point is that this subpractice does not
seem to be independent of PP and its requirements in the manner
in which CP is independent of religious practice, or unique person
practice of interpersonal perceptual practice. CP and unique person
practice seem, in short, to be noninferential mediated practices and
therefore entirely self-contained in terms of their belief content.
We have seen this with CP: the Christian content seems to be
wholly internal to that religious tradition and is communicated
through authority and the credulity disposition. I submit that
unique person practice functions in roughly the same way. Our
coming to learn the names of people, and hence to identify and
reidentify them, is entirely internal to the authority of others, the
credulity disposition, and certain social relationships conditioned
by these first two factors. Accordingly, if our unique person prac
tice beliefs are justified, it is through holistic considerations and not
experiential ones (more on this below) . I think, then, that PTN
stands the best chance of being true, rather than a parity thesis in
which CP is paired with unique physical object practice or a prac
tice generating memory beliefs about epistemically unique individ
ual things.
One final point needs to be clarified. In Chapter 5, Section 2 , I
argued that one could rank epistemic practices within the subclass
of nontrivially self-supported practices. This could be done, I said,
on the basis of the closeness of the cognitive connection between
experience and belief (the issue of conceptual-reading vs. nonin
ferential mediated practices) . I also called attention to Alston's
claim that one might rank practices from a cognitive point of view
because of features such as predictive power, and I raised the issue
of the relationship between these "cognitive attractions" and what I
argued above are the epistemically important roles of the back
ground beliefs. One might raise the following question: if concep
tual-reading practices are epistemically and not simply cognitively
superior to noninferential mediated practices, then why cast PTN
in terms of rationality rather than justification? Briefly, it seems to
me that Alston's characterization of the relationship of the justifica
tion of beliefs to doxastic practices is correct, and, although we
have an intuition about the epistemic superiority of conceptual-
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reading practices over against noninferential mediated practices,
this intuition rests in the cognitive attractiveness of the former over
the latter. At the end of the day, the best way to get at these rank
ings, even though they have an epistemic justificatory component,
is to discuss them in the metaepistemological framework of ratio
nality, with its internal judgments that the practices are more, or
less, reliable. In addition to this point, I believe that, although the
distinction between conceptual-reading and noninferential medi
ated practices is an epistemically important one, the epistemic ad
vantage of the former over the latter does not remove the latter
from being reliable or justified.
PTN has, then, at least one advantage over the others we have
considered. It does not fall prey to a disanalogy in regard to the
need for background beliefs. Both CP and unique person practice
are noninferential mediated practices. The obvious question to ask,
however, is why this is an advantage, since I have already argued
that the appeal to background beliefs seems to force the Reformed
epistemologist into either natural theology (or other inferential evi
dence provision) or an infinite regress of justifications, in either
case calling the Reformed epistemology project into question. The
best response to this issue is seen in the move to certain holistic
considerations that seem to be required by noninferential mediated
practices or at least such practices that strongly rely on their back
ground beliefs. I have hinted at certain aspects of these holistic con
siderations. In the next section I make them at least somewhat
more explicit. Natural theology or arbitrariness are not the only
options for CP's background beliefs.

2 . Comportment and Confirmation

Beliefs are not held individually; they are held in complex
groups. The web of belief is intricate. The relations between one
belief and another, and between beliefs and experiences, are not
easily untangled. This complex of beliefs and experiences might be
described in terms of beliefs more or less "fitting" well together,
"cohering" well together, or, as I say here, "comporting" well to
gether. The example of remembering eating breakfast this morn
ing provides an illustration of what I mean by comportment. But,
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before looking at the example, some observations are in order.
First, consider the more traditional models of foundationalism such
as those that emphasize self-evidence or incorrigibility as the crite
rion for proper basicality. On such models a person would, under
normal circumstances at least, not attempt to confirm a properly
basic belief. After all, a basic belief has the advantage of being so
well grounded that no other belief is more firmly grounded. Thus,
not only is there supposed to be no need for further justification or
confirmation, no such justification or confirmation is even 'possi
ble. To which beliefs would one appeal? Properly basic beliefs are
considered certain or unassailable in terms of their epistemic justi
fication. No other belief or set of beliefs could provide assurance of
justification for a properly basic belief, because no other belief is
more firmly justified. On such models properly basic beliefs are
considered to have a privileged epistemic status.
With weaker models of foundationalism, Plantinga's included,
basic beliefs do not hold such a special status. They can be chal
lenged, and one may then wish to appeal to other beliefs to shore
up the status of the belief in question. Returning again to the dis
cussion of the confirmation challenge, recall that Grigg claims that,
although we constantly have outside sources for confirmation of
such beliefs, this shoring up does not provide justification. He is
correct, if justification's only source is experientially grounded.
Here Grigg seems to be wary of the danger of letting beliefs slip
from a properly basic status to an inferential status. But if confir
mation provides holistic grounds for justification, and Plantinga's
account of coherence systems is correct (i. e. , given that coherence
provides justification, all justified beliefs in coherent systems are
properly basic), 4 then the beliefs in question can remain properly
basic even though other beliefs are involved in their j ustification.
Putting this concern into Alston's language, such beliefs could be
justified by coherence relationships but not be mediated inferen
tially. Furthermore, confirmation need not be understood in a
strictly predictive manner. Instead, we may simply appeal to the
fact that under most circumstances the paradigm beliefs comport
well with the rest of our experiences and noetic structure.
4. See Plantinga, " Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in
God, " pp. 1 23-26.
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What does it mean to say that a belief comports well? Return
now to the breakfast example. Even on the weaker foundational
models one would not, in most circumstances, worry about con
firming one's belief that one ate breakfast this morning. It is a
memory belief and under typical conditions can be legitimately
taken to be properly basic. Although I may rely on the fact that the
practice that generated this belief-memory-is validated by many
other sets of circumstances and beliefs, I do not typically set out to
confirm my memory beliefs or to validate the practice from which
they come. But suppose I have the belief that I ate breakfast this
morning and then come home to discover that there are no dirty
dishes in the sink. This bit of information may be disconcerting,
for I know that this week my wife is away on one of her research
trips, my son is with some friends, no one else has a key to my
condo, I never wash the dishes in the morning because they are
few (being aware of our current drought, I do not wish to waste
water in a half-empty dishwasher), and so forth. Now, to discover
a lack of dirty dishes at least generates a certain amount of wonder;
why are there no dishes in the sink? Here we have a lack of com
portment between belief and experience (or the belief generated by
the experience)-a lack of confirmation, as it were.
How can this lack of comportment be explained? There are
many ways, no doubt, but one example suffices. Although I do
remember eating breakfast this morning, what I had forgotten is
that I woke up late and therefore merely stopped for a doughnut
on the way to work rather than taking time to cook. This explains
the lack of dishes in the sink, and now the complex of my noetic
structure confirms the original belief. The lack of comportment I
discovered initially as I found the sink barren of dishes is explained
by reference to other factors. The important thing to note is that
my belief is related in detailed ways to my other beliefs and experi
ence and that these relations provide a certain kind of confirma
tion. Also important is that one cannot tell ahead of time which
(set of) belief(s) will be problematic in the face of new experiences
or beliefs that lack comportment with present beliefs.
Given this somewhat broader understanding of confirmation,
the theist can suggest that she has what I call comportment among
her theistic beliefs, or at least comportment similar enough to that
found for beliefs delivered by unique person practice to allow the
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move from that comportment to the status of being nontrivially
supported (in Alston's sense). From there she may legitimately
claim that many of her theistic (or Christian) beliefs are properly
basic or immediately justified. I believe there is comportment for
PP's and interpersonal perceptual practice's deliverances as well.
These constitute nontrivial self-support for those practices. Com
portment for CP and unique person practice's deliverances plays
dual roles, however. Not only does it provide nontrivial self-sup
port for the practices, but it provides justification for the beliefs in
question. This is necessary for the deliverences of CP and unique
person practice, for they do not have the advantage of being expe
rientially justified as do the deliverances of PP, interpersonal per
ceptual practice, religious practice, and unique physical object
practice.
3·

Examples

I think the best evidence for these claims is to develop a set of
examples of unique person practice beliefs and CP beliefs that
comport well with other beliefs and experience, within their re
spective frameworks. That, at least, is the approach I take here.
First consider unique person practice and its deliverances. Our
use of proper names for individual humans is in many ways philo
sophically problematic. What do we do when we pick someone
out of the crowd with such utterances as " Stan went over there"? Is
"Stan" to be understood as a definite description or a proper name?
What is the nature of reference? What about extension, or inten
sion? Fortunately, here we need not worry about these issues. I
want simply to call attention to certain epistemic considerations
that come into play with our everyday use of proper names in
perceptual contexts. Note, first, that when one learns to pick out,
perceptually, a unique individual person one either has to be intro
duced to that person by the individual in question or by someone
else. One is told (by an authority) that "this or that individual" is
"so and so" -that person by the tree wearing the bright orange
shirt is Stan (or, in first person, "I am Stan") . Our credulity dispo
sition is activated at the very introduction of the name and the link
to its referent. Is there some independent vehicle for checking this
information? Maybe one could attempt to verify the information
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by checking the government records, but here one still relies on
authority. Once the name is learned-once the person is epi
stemically baptized with the name-we can only appeal to mem
ory or other "reintroductions" to access the information. Where do
beliefs thus generated get their justification? The best one can do is
appeal to that initial learning situation and the trust we have in the
source. Wherein lies that trust? The credulity disposition, as noted
above, is modified as we mature epistemically. We learn to trust
others, but only with discrimination. In particular, some people are
bad with names. It is in circumstances in which one believes one's
sources not to be good with names that one's belief that that is
Stan needs confirmation-at least explicitly. And so we listen to
others' identifications of the person in question and in particular
note the extent to which the belief (or its near relatives) is socially
embedded. Once we have the belief that Stan is such and such a
person, then we learn to use and apply the name in appropriate
contexts. In particular, we learn how Stan (typically) looks or acts:
that he has certain features (a young face for his middle-fifties, and
slightly stooped shoulders) or that he is habitual in certain ways
(his office door is always closed when he is working inside, he is
friendly with David but he greatly dislikes Sue). It is this complex
of associations, physical and social, along with other background
information (such as that Stan is back from vacation) that allows
unique person practice to generate beliefs such as "Stan is coming
down the hill. " But suppose I know that Stan said he would not be
back in town until the 2oth and it is only the I 5th, and the figure I
see, although it has stooped shoulders and a characteristically
youthful facial appearance, is laughing and talking with Sue? Then
unique person practice does not, except when not working well,
generate the belief "Stan is coming down the hill. " In short, we
learn to generate beliefs about epistemically unique individual per
sons-and are justified in holding these beliefs-only if they com
port well with other beliefs and experiences.
In short, justification of unique person beliefs is holistic in these
ways. First, no experience itself (qua phenomenon) gives us beliefs
about persons qua epistemically unique individuals. There is al
ways reliance on authority and credulity. There is, then, some kind
,
of experience that is the source of belief, but the experience itself
does not justify beliefs generated by it. Second, such beliefs either
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fit or do not fit with our other beliefs and experiences. They either
comport well or they do not (there is, of course, a continuum
here) . When they do, they are justified.
What of the deliverances of CP? Theists, in particular Christian
theists, do not hold their religious beliefs as free-standing beliefs.
Much as humans hold more ordinary beliefs in complex patterns
and with more or less loose relationships to experience, theists or
ganize their religious beliefs in patterns that entangle beliefs �me
with another as well as with experience. For example, the belief
that God loves me is often connected to beliefs about God's provi
dential care for me. Beliefs about God's providential care may well
be related to beliefs about God's gracious activity in molding my
character, to beliefs about the activity of God through the loving
actions of others, or to beliefs about God's meeting my needs,
emotional and otherwise. Furthermore, these beliefs may well be
entangled with some of my experiences.
Consider this. The pastor of a church believes that God cares for
her and her church deeply, but the pastor is discouraged about the
progress in her parish. New converts are not coming into the faith,
the parishioners are not as active as they ought to be, and the like.
Suppose, however, a parishioner who has not been active is coun
seled by the pastor. This is the beginning of an education in the
meaning of Christian service and in the meaning of sharing the
gospel. The parishioner begins to serve and to share. Eventually,
through the work of this parishioner, the parish begins to grow,
people begin new relationships with God and other people, and so
forth. Over a period of time, the discouragement wanes, the pastor
is renewed. She has, it appears, had confirmation that God does,
indeed, care for her and her church.
A further example. Christians and Jews believe that the dove is a
symbol of the renewal of the world. Noah sent out a dove when
he tested to see if the waters of the great flood had subsided. The
dove was sent out three times. On the first it returned not having
found a place to rest. It returned from the second carrying a newly
sprouted olive leaf to Noah. On the third it did not return. Noah
then knew the waters had abated. And for the Christian there is an
additional layer of meaning: the dove is also a symbol of the Holy
Spirit. When Jesus came to John the Baptist to be baptized, "the
spirit, descending as a dove, " came to rest on Jesus (John I :J2,
NASV). These symbols are entwined in the minds of many Chris-
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tians by the belief that the Spirit is both the Comforter and the
Creator, the one who encourages and the one who renews the
world. The Spirit, the dove, is thus considered the one who re
news discouraged believers. Now suppose a Christian, holding a
set of beliefs such as those described, becomes discouraged. He is
questioning whether God really cares for him. As he walks out
among the trees of the church grounds, a dove descends and
alights on his shoulder. The bird rests there for four or five min
utes, as the Christian considers his plight, his commitments, his
God. Could this dove's activity be taken as confirmation that God
does indeed care? As the dove wings its way back toward heaven,
the Christian feels his burdens lightened and a sudden rush of joy
fills his heart; he is emotionally and spiritually renewed. Although
the link may be weak from the point of view of a nontheistic web
of belief, for the Christian holding a full-blown set of theistic be
liefs this event would be very strong confirmation that God does
indeed love and care for him. 5
There are clear parallels to our beliefs about individual humans.
Suppose I am discouraged by a disagreement I have some morning
with my wife. On arriving at work later that day, I find some
freshly cut blue flowers in my office. Knowing that the first
flowers I ever gave my wife were blue, that they have become a
symbol of faithfulness and love for us, that many if not most peo
ple would not give flowers to a man, I believe that these flowers
came from my wife. I cease being discouraged, believing that all is
well with our relationship.
A final example. Suppose a committed Christian-call her Re
becca-believes that God calls some people to leadership. In fact,
Rebecca believes that God wants some believers to be in leader
ship, in particular academic leadership. Suppose further that after
prayer Rebecca has the impression that God wants her within the
halls of academia. Thus motivated, she acts in ways consistent with
5· A series of events similar to these happened to my pastor, Curtis D. Peter
son. On reading part of an earlier draft of this essay, Burleigh T. Wilkins noted
that my pastor was lucky that the dove wasn't a turkey vulture! But what would
such an event have meant for the Christian? Perhaps nothing, or perhaps it would

have been understood as one more bit of evidence for the evil in the world. How
Christians respond to such evil can itself be part of the web of belief and experience
which, when taken together, provides confirmation for the Christian worldview.
Compare the stories of Job and Habbakuk from the Hebrew testament.
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this impression; she asks her academic advisers about her suitability
for further graduate work. She is encouraged to, and does, apply
to several of the best graduate schools. In the midst of this en
deavor, Rebecca maintains her cautious skepticism. She thinks ac
ceptance at these schools quite unlikely. As human beings are wont
to be, she is not particularly self-assured.
To complicate matters, Rebecca is married to another graduate
student. She is concerned that her marriage remain strong, for a� a
Christian she believes God is unhappy with broken relationships
and, in particular, broken marriages. In this regard, she is con
cerned that her husband's career not be adversely affected by her
plans coming to fruition. Finally, suppose Rebecca is also concerned
that she not go further into debt to pay for her education. She is thus
inclined to pray that, if God truly wishes her to attend graduate
school, he confirm her rather tentatively held belief that she should
go to graduate school in order to be eventually enabled to work
within academia. Specifically, she asks God for the following two
things. First, if she is to attend one of these graduate programs, God
must provide sufficient funds so she can avoid further debt. Second,
if she is to attend, her husband's career ought not to be hurt.
In light of the first request, three things occur. First, Rebecca is
admitted to four of the five Ivy League schools to which she ap
plies. Second, three of the four schools that grant her admission
provide financial support. Third, two of the three schools offering
support provide very large financial packages, one covering three
years of tuition and living expenses, the other covering four years.
This appears to be confirmation that God wants Rebecca in gradu
ate school and, by extension, that he wants her in academic ser
vice. As to the other request, Rebecca's husband, having not yet
finished his Ph. D . , is offered a one-year teaching post (an event,
given the job market of recent years, that is nigh unto a miracle in
itsel£1) . This offer is quite unexpected and certainly furthers his ca
reer more quickly than were he not gaining teaching experience.
Rebecca's attending the graduate school of her choice seems to be
open at this point and her belief confirmed.
The web of Rebecca's belief system is complicated; the experi
ences she has and beliefs she later forms comport well with the
belief that God wants her to serve within the halls of academia.
This case and the earlier two (and others that can be generated
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easily) seem close enough to cases of unique person practice belief
and unique person practice experience comportment to allow the
move to proper basicality or justification for Christian theistic be
liefs; one's engaging in such practices is rational and nontrivially
supported.
Furthermore, unique person practice and CP are parallel in more
than the comportment of their deliverances with other beliefs and
experiences. They also have quite parallel self-support in terms of
relational development. As Alston notes, CP receives nontrivial
self-support from the fact that its participants develop spiritually.
In short, they mature and develop in their relationship to God.
Unique person practice allows us to develop similarly in our rela
tionships to other people. Alston claims that it is interpersonal per
ceptual practice that does this. More likely, I believe, it is unique
person practice, for in most cases our relational skills develop only
where we know, more or less intimately, other people. Interper
sonal perceptual practice, as I characterized it, is not the practice
that allows us such intimacy. But there is no hard and fast rule
here. Interpersonal perceptual practice can perhaps generate beliefs
such as "humans are the types of beings who suffer when in pain"
even when I have no names attached to them, and hence no inti
macy. I can still feel impelled to provide aid and thus become more
relationally sensitive. Parallel to this, religious practice may make
us more religiously sensitive, but it is only the intimacy allowed by
CP (or other practices, e.g., Buddhist practice, Hindu practice)
that provides for deep spiritual and relational growth.
In short, these sets of beliefs and experiences, when the beliefs
and experiences are taken together, seem to provide some reason
for one to think that the Christian theistic beliefs in question are
true (or at least as much reason as in unique person practice cases,
given that there too confirmation comes from within the very
practice from which the original belief came), even though the sit
uations and circumstances are not predictable. They thus give the
theist some reason to take her beliefs to be properly basic or imme
diately justified, even though the experience that provides for their
genesis does not function in a justificatory manner. It is, of course,
important to remember that comportment is not (typically) con
sciously inferential. When it is, then the beliefs generated are not
basic or immediate.
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The Anything-Goes Challenge

The critic is likely to raise a challenge to PTN that is related to
the confirmation challenge. She can claim that the problem with
these examples is that, although it may be true that the suggested
beliefs comport well with other beliefs held by the Christian or
theist, just about any experience or belief can be taken to comport
well with such beliefs. The theist can twist and turn to make any
beliefs or experiences fit. The important question, the critic con
tinues, is this. What exactly does not comport well with the theist's
beliefs? Let us call this the "anything-goes challenge. "
The anything-goes challenge introduces some new issues into
the discussion which merit attention. Perhaps the challenge is cor
rect. The disanalogy is not that theistic beliefs do not comport well
with other beliefs and experiences but that they comport too well.
Perhaps theistic noetic structures can be manipulated to fit what
ever facts come along, whereas nontheistic structures cannot. The
anything-goes challenge is a kind of arbitrariness challenge. It is
reminiscent of the challenge brought against theists by Antony
Flew in the now famous discussion "Theology and Falsification. "
There Flew challenges the religious believer thus: "What would
have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof
of the love of, or the existence of God. "6 Now, Flew's challenge is
intimately tied to the question of the falsifiability of theological
assertions, but we can avoid that issue to concentrate on another. If
we rephrase Flew's challenge in terms of the present discussion, it
can be understood in this way: just what set of beliefs and experi
ences would lead the theist to conclude that there is a lack of com
portment within the theistic noetic structure?
Considering Basil Mitchell's parable given in response to Flew's
challenge sheds some light on this issue:
In time of war in an occupied country, a member of the resistance
meets one night a stranger who deeply impresses him. They spend
that night together in conversation. The Stranger tells the partisan
that he himself is on the side of the resistance-indeed that he is in
command of it, and urges the partisan to have faith in him no mat6. Antony Flew, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell, "Theology and Falsifica
tion, " in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair Mac
Intyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 99.
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ter what happens. The partisan is utterly convinced at that meeting
of the Stranger's sincerity and constancy and undertakes to trust
him.
They never meet in conditions of intimacy again. But sometimes
the Stranger is seen helping members of the resistance, and the par
tisan is grateful and says to his friends, "He is on our side."
Sometimes he is seen in the uniform of the police handing over
patriots to the occupying power. On these occasions his friends
murmur against him: but the partisan still says, "He is on our side."
He still believes that, in spite of appearances, the Stranger did not
deceive him. Sometimes he asks the Stranger for help and receives
it. He is then thankful. Sometimes he asks and does not receive it.
Then he says, "The Stranger knows best." Sometimes his friends, in
exasperation, say "Well, what would he have to do for you to admit
that you were wrong and that he is not on our side?" But the parti
san refuses to answer. He will not consent to put the Stranger to the
test. And sometimes his friends complain, "Well, if that's what you
mean by his being on our side, the sooner he goes over to the other
side the better."7

Mitchell's parable is rich in insight and deserves fuller treatment
than I give here. I wish to concentrate on only one facet. The parti
san has some experiences that do not comport well with the rest of
his Stranger beliefs. When the Stranger is in the uniform of the
police and turns over members of the resistance to the enemy, the
partisan wonders about the loyalty of the Stranger. One might
even imagine a slightly different-but more existentially power
ful-parable in which the Stranger appears to be turning over the
partisan himself to the enemy. Surely neither of these events com
ports well with the partisan's commitment to the Stranger's being
"on our side, " just as the theist's commitment to the love of God
may not comport well with the appearance of God's giving the
theist over to evil. But in neither the Stranger nor the God case
does the believer hurriedly give up the belief in question.
This brings to light an important fact. Although it is true that
some things may not comport well with a given theistic structure,
this seems equally true of nontheistic structures. If we take a natu
ralistic (read: the physical universe is all there is) worldview to be a
competitor of the Christian worldview, we discover that not all the
7- Ibid. , pp. 103-4.
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"facts" always fit. Suppose we take the scientific theorizing of the
naturalist to be (roughly) parallel to the theologizing of the Chris
tian, and then take scientific methodology to be a subpractice of
PP. I do not mean to conflate science and naturalism here. Rather,
I am relying on what appears to be the temptation, and indeed
practice, of many naturalists to take science as the best approach to
the discovery of the most general truths about "all that is. " On this
kind of naturalism, PP, scientific methodology, and the scientific
theorizing that go along with them take on the role of being the
primary, if not the only, means of obtaining truth. Insofar as the
naturalistic worldview provides control over what will or can be
taken to be factual or meaningful, metaphysics reduces to the re
sults of science. Accordingly, science can be construed as essential
to naturalism in a way that it is not to theism. But I do not mean
to suggest that science and naturalism are identical, nor that science
has no home within a theistic worldview.
With this framework understood, consider the problem of
anomalies in scientific theorizing. What does one do when one's
theory conflicts with some newly discovered data or when one's
confirming experiment fails to confirm? Or what happens when
one's naturalistic science runs up against an apparent miracle?
Something has to be given up, but it is not always clear which
belief (or beliefs) ought to go. Sometimes it is hard to tell, and the
best policy is to wait. This is, indeed, what the naturalist does.
Likewise with the theist, at least on occasion. There are things that
engender a lack of comportment with a theistic noetic structure,
and it may appear to the anything-goes critic as if the theist can
take anything to comport. But this is not the theist's special prob
lem. The theist learns to live with some of that lack of comport
ment, as does the naturalist.
Mitchell rightly recognized a similar thrust behind Flew's chal
lenge and hence raised a question of his own parable: when does it
become silly for the partisan to continue to believe in the Stranger?
We can paraphrase the question and ask at what point it becomes
silly for the theist to modify her noetic structure so that any experi
ence or belief comports well. Such a point exists, or at least so it
seems. Plantinga, for example, admits that counterevidence against
theistic belief may lead one away from theistic belief. Ultimately,
then, not just any and all beliefs or experiences can be made to
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comport well with theistic beliefs. Although one must admit that
some theists may be irrational and allow anything to comport well
with their theistic beliefs, we need only consider a believer who is
closer to being a model of rationality. The anything-goes chal
lenge, I claim, does not apply to her.
Which beliefs and experiences can and which cannot be made to
comport well with the rest of one's noetic structure must be de
cided on an individual basis. But it seems that the critic who ac
cuses the theist in general of taking just any and all beliefs and expe
riences as comporting well with her noetic structure is wrong.
Suppose Rebecca, after her prayer, had not received financial aid.
Suppose further that her husband did not obtain a job. Could she
have incorporated these events into her noetic structure and main
tained it as well-comporting? Do these experiences and beliefs con
tinue to fit with her belief that she should go to graduate school?
Possibly. Suppose Rebecca also believes that God is testing her
faith; she understands these new circumstances as God's means of
encouraging her to fulfill her commitment of faith to him in some
other way. As noted in Chapter 1 0, one of the cautions mature
Christians often urge on the younger is that requested confirma
tion not be of a predictive variety. The premedical student who
asks God to help him do well on the entrance exams fails to get the
kind of confirmation he wishes. A caution against expecting too
much, however, does not mean that God never provides.
But there are some things that Rebecca could not incorporate, at
least not in any simple way. Suppose her husband becomes quite ill
and she is needed at home. Or suppose it becomes clear that Re
becca's attending graduate school will indeed bring her marriage to
an end. Depending on how deeply rooted her commitments to
marriage are and perhaps on how deeply entwined her beliefs
about marriage are with Christian beliefs, she may be unwilling to
understand these new events as comporting well with her belief
that God wants her to attend graduate school. Clearly she is wrong
about something, and given the hierarchy of beliefs she has within
her noetic structure, it would seem that her belief that God wants
her in graduate school is the one that should be given up. Not just
anything comports well with a theistic noetic structure.
If the anything-goes challenger is persistent, she might press
again. She might suggest that, with enough alterations in the the-
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ist' s noetic structure, Rebecca can make these beliefs comport. She
may need to alter her understanding of God in some radical way
maybe God is really evil and intent on destroying her marriage. At
this point the defense can rest on two points. First, such a radical
modification of Rebecca's noetic structure seems to destroy the claim
that it is theistic or at least that it is specifically Christian. To demand
this much of one's noetic structure in order to retain one's commit
ment seems somewhat disingenuous. Second, if theistic structQres
face the problem of radical noetic modification to protect a cherished
belief, a similar point is true of nontheistic noetic structures.
This last point can be fleshed out. R. M. Hare's contribution to
the "Falsification and Theology" discussion can help here:
A certain lunatic is convinced that all dons want to murder him. His

friends introduce him to all the mildest and most respectable dons
that they can find, and after each of them has retired, they say,
"You see, he doesn't really want to murder you; he spoke to you in
a most cordial manner; surely you are convinced now?" But the
lunatic replies, "Yes, but that was only his diabolical cunning; he's
really plotting against me the whole time, like the rest of them; I
know it I tell you." However many kindly dons are produced, the
reaction is still the same. 8

Clearly the lunatic is prepared to take any experience to be consis
tent with his belief that the dons want to murder him. Nothing
will stand in his way.
The lesson to be drawn from this parable for the anything-goes
challenger seems to be that the reading of a set of beliefs and cir
cumstances can vary widely and that the possibility of such a wide
variety of changes in one's noetic structure is not limited to theists.
One can always attempt to add explanatory epicycles to one's be
liefs in order to hold on to them. When should one add epicycles?
That varies with the circumstances and with the depth of ingres
sion of the beliefs involved. How many and what kind of epicycles
can be rationally added is a function of how deeply entrenched the
beliefs are in one's epistemic structure and how much other evi
dence is connected to the beliefs. These issues cannot be decided
independently of looking at a given noetic structure.
8. Ibid . , pp. 99- IOO.
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If the picture presented here is correct, the anything-goes chal
lenge is met. Not just any data can be made to comport well with
one's theistic noetic structure, at least for the model rational theist.
There comes a point beyond which it is silly to add explanatory
epicycles to one's noetic structure. Furthermore, just as one can
move beyond being a model rational theist, one can move beyond
being a model rational nontheist. There is nothing unique about
theistic noetic structures, at least in this regard.
5.

Religious Plurality Revisited

A second challenge to PTN depends again on the existence
of diverse religious epistemic practices. The critic might challenge
PTN in the following way. There is an important difference be
tween unique person practice and CP. Those who engage in
unique person practice with particular persons do not generally dis
agree about the existence or the characteristics of persons with
whom they do not (but others do) engage in unique person prac
tice. And those others can come to engage in unique person prac
tice with the persons with whom the former engage in it without
giving up all previous involvements. But among the beliefs in
volved in CP is the belief that there is only one God and that that
God has certain characteristics. Therefore, one cannot engage in
CP and, for example, Jewish practice or Muslim practice or Hindu
practice. Thus, the decision to engage in CP implies the decision
not to engage in any of these other particular religious practices.
But those who engage in CP typically do not merely refrain from
engaging in these other practices. They also claim that these prac
tices are based on (or essentially involve) false beliefs. But there is
no analogy to this in unique person practice. In short, to engage in
CP I must hold that there are false beliefs involved in the religious
practices of others, but to engage in unique person practice with
my colleagues I do not have to hold that there are false beliefs
involved in the interpersonal belief-forming practices of other peo
ple. Nor do I have to hold that people engaged in unique person
practice with those with whom I do not engage in it are all some
how badly mistaken about the existence or characteristics of those
with whom they engage in unique person practice. If it is said that
adherents of different religions are not involved with a different
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deity but instead have different beliefs about the same deity, then
one should still have to ask why one should think that distinctively
Christian beliefs about this deity are correct. The presence of this
feature in CP (and presumably in other religious practices as well)
raises the specter of arbitrariness again. The same sorts of confir
mation available to Christians who engage in CP would be avail
able to Jews who engage in Jewish practice and to Muslims who
engage in Muslim practice. And it is likely that confirmations actu
ally occur in the lives of people engaging in Jewish practice and
Muslim practice in roughly the same quantity and quality as the
confirmations that occur in the lives of those who engage in CP.
But some beliefs essential to each of these practices seem to contra
dict each other, so they cannot all be true. For example, either God
reconciled the world to himself in Jesus or God did not, so either
Christians or Jews are wrong on this matter. Why then engage in
CP rather than Jewish practice, Muslim practice, or Hindu prac
tice? PTN turns out not to be true, since there is a kind of arbitrari
ness involved in engaging in CP that does not exist when one en
gages in unique person practice. Let us call this challenge the
"religious plurality challenge. "9
There are several issues involved in the religious plurality chal
lenge to PTN• but perhaps the central one is that anyone engaging
in CP must claim that those who engage in other competing reli
gious epistemic practices have false beliefs. In short, there are inter
practice contradictions. This criticism has similarities to the chal
lenge of religious diversity to the parity thesis between PP and CP
which is the straw that breaks the camel's back in Alston's discus
sion. Recall that, according to Alston, the challenge of religious
plurality to the rationality of engaging in CMP (CP) arises in the
following way. Even if the perceptual beliefs we have about God
do not conflict themselves, the practices forming such beliefs are
still subject to serious conflict by virtue of the associated belief sys
tems. Given the rich diversity among religious doxastic practices,
only one, if any, of the practices can be reliable. Why suppose it is
CP? There are many reasons internal to CP, but we seem to need
9. The source of this criticism is an anonymous reviewer for Cornell Univer
sity Press. Although not an exact quotation, the previous two paragraphs are a
very close paraphrase of a section of the reviewer's report to the press.
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reasons external to the practice, since all the practices presumably
have internal reasons.
As we have seen, Alston argues that this fact does not dissipate
the justificatory efficacy of CP, but it does reduce the strength of
justification for CP vis-a-vis PP, and therefore a parity thesis be
tween PP and CP is not forthcoming. Similar points can be made
about CP here. CP is not stripped of its rational efficacy because of
plurality. But then the religious plurality challenge does not sug
gest that it is. The criticism is that PTN is not true not because CP
lacks rationality altogether but because the strength of rationality
that accrues to CP is not as great as that which accrues to unique
person practice. But exactly why should that be taken to be true?
CP requires that those who engage in it claim that those who do
not (but rather engage in competitors to CP) are engaged in a prac
tice based on or essentially involving false beliefs. Unique person
practice does not. But what exactly is the problem? Is it that
unique person practice has more overall rationality than CP? That
is not the criticism, at least not explicitly. But that is what it would
take to show that PTN is false. Why think that the "arbitrariness"
attached to engaging in religious practices shows that the overall
rationality is lower than it would be without that arbitrariness? The
basic point seems to be that, because of the existence of competi
tors to CP, engaging in CP is arbitrary. Therefore, as Alston sug
gests in discussing the justificatory efficacy of CP, even though the
existence of these other practices does not dissipate the justifica
tion, it does seem to reduce it significantly.
In Alston's case, however, the comparison is between competing
practices-CP, Muslim practice, Jewish practice-and PP, which
has no actual competitors. The comparison is between practices
taken, so to speak, from the "outside. " What I mean by "outside"
is that CP and PP are compared from a sort of neutral point of
view. CP, Jewish practice, Muslim practice, and so forth are, taken
as individual practices, each supposed to put us into effective epi
stemic relationship to the Ultimate. Thus each one provides us
with competing understandings of the Ultimate. PP has no such
actual competitors. It has only possible competitors-the White
headian or Cartesian ways of viewing physical objects as opposed
to the Aristotelian way of so doing. Alston suggests that because
these are only possible ways of viewing the world, whereas with
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the religious practices there are actual ways of viewing the Ulti
mate, the epistemic status of CP (and its competitors) is lower than
that of PP.
But this "outside" view is not the one taken by the religious
plurality challenger vis-a-vis PTN. Rather, the criticism relies on
"inside" features of the various epistemic practices. Although there
are no competitors to unique person practice, an important feature
of unique person practice is that it can be engaged in with many
different people, thus giving us beliefs about many different peo
ple. This is not true of CP. There is, supposedly, only one person
with whom CP puts us into contact. This, in addition, perhaps, to
certain exclusivity claims involved in CP ("No one comes to the
Father but through me, " as Jesus says), leads to a denial of CP's
competitors understood as legitimate means of gaining rational be
liefs about the Ultimate. With unique person practice the assump
tion is that when you and I engage in it, if we meet and get to
know two different people, I will not suggest that your engaging
in unique person practice with Sally rather than Jim, say, is based
on false beliefs. This assumption is internal to the practice itself.
From this internal perspective, there is no arbitrariness involved in
engaging in unique person practice with different people. If you
were to met Jim, as I have, you too would have Gustified) beliefs
about him. In contrast, if I engage in CP, while you engage in
Muslim practice, I will not admit that you are in contact with Al
lah, nor will I admit that Allah, understood as a being meta
physically distinct from the God and Father of Jesus Christ, exists.
These beliefs are internal to CP.
But why does this show that the strength of rationality accorded
to CP is less than that accorded to unique person practice? There
are many, many human persons with whom we can have social
engagement, and unique person practice is a practice designed to
allow just that. But there is only one God, according to CP. The
religious plurality challenge, as construed above, treats all the com
peting religious epistemic practices as if, taken as a group, they
were like slices of a grand, Ultimate unique person practice, one
slice, let us say, being the Christian unique person practice, another
the Muslim unique person practice, and another the Jewish unique
person practice. This would be c�mparable to dividing up unique
person practice into slices, one being, let us say, the Jim unique
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person practice, another the Sally unique person practice, and
again, the Frank unique person practice, and yet another, the Mary
unique person practice. To get an appropriate analogy between
unique person practice and CP, on this understanding, one would
have to say that those engaged in the Jim unique person practice
are suggesting that those engaged in the Sally unique person prac
tice, Frank unique person practice, or Mary unique person practice
are engaged in practices based on or essentially involving false be
liefs about Sally, Frank, or Mary. But this is ludicrous. It is part
and parcel of unique person practice that one assume that there are
many other humans with whom one engages in unique person
practice. That is part of unique person practice's nature. This is not
true of CP or, for that matter, ofJewish practice, Muslim practice,
or (at least many of) the other religious epistemic practices. It is the
reverse of surprising, then, that there are competitors in the field of
religious epistemic practices, at least from the point of view of a
strict analogy between the "inside" commitments of unique person
practice and CP. It simply is not required of us, when we engage
in unique person practice, that we make the kind of denials that are
required of us when we engage in CP or the other religious epi
stemic practices. If it were otherwise, we would suspect something
amiss in our epistemic conduct of the religious practices.
Perhaps, however, the religious plurality challenger means only
to suggest something closer in line with Alston's evaluation of the
parity between PP and CP. Perhaps the criticism is simply meant
to claim that the important difference between unique person prac
tice and CP is that, taken from the outside, unique person practice
has no actual competitors whereas CP does, and although this does
not dissipate the rationality of engaging in CP it does lower the
strength of the rationality by lowering the strength of the non
trivial self-support of CP. What is to be said here? If one admits
that Alston's account of the matter vis-a-vis PP and CP is accurate,
does the same not hold true here?
The best way to combat this challenge is head-on. There are two
steps to so doing. First, the argument relies on the fact that Jewish
practice, Muslim practice, CP, and so forth all have, more or less,
the same strength of internal support and, furthermore, that there
is little if any external support. Recall, as a first step, that Alston
takes the worst-case scenario and assumes that there is no external
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support for CP over other practices. One thing to do, in response
to the religious plurality challenge, is to consider the possibility
that there is external support for CP. That, of course, is a tall order
and one I do not attempt to fill here. It is, furthermore, one I
consider to be an unlikely source of solace for the religious be
liever. Nevertheless, if it could be shown that there is significant
external support for CP which is not matched by other religious
practices, that would effectively kill the criticism.
The second step, and to my mind a more promising one, is to
challenge one of the central assumptions of the criticism-that
Jewish practice, Muslim practice, CP, and so forth all have the
same strength of internal support. The critic certainly assumes this
to be the case, as does Alston. As far as Alston's case goes, and this
is not to belittle its strength, there may be much more to say about
the internal support of various religious practices. But to say any
thing about them in this regard requires a great deal of work on the
details of various religions and the epistemic practices in which
their practioners engage. This is a much larger task than I am able
to take on. But before the religious plurality challenge can be said
to be successful against PTN• this work needs to be done. Of
course, in an era of pluralism and of extreme religious tolerance,
the suggestion that we need to engage in what Paul Griffiths calls
"inter-religious apologetics" is going to be controversial. 10 Nev
ertheless, it needs to be done. Until it is, the religious plurality
challenge to PTN cannot be fully evaluated.
I have not done the hard work needed for a full reply to the
religious plurality challenge to PTN· I have pointed out where the
digging needs to start and that is, I believe, enough at least to raise
questions about the success of the criticism. In short, it is not ob
vious that it will be successful. People on both sides need to engage
in more work before the grave can be completed.
6. Confirmation, Validation, and Rationality
Two final comments about confirmation are in order before we
leave the subject. First, in some cases nonpredictive confirmation
10. See Paul J. Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics, " Faith and Philosophy 5
( 1 988): 399-420.
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of theistic beliefs may be possible only where the theistic belief to
be confirmed is a fairly general or broad belief. This is one sim
ilarity between (some cases of) nonpredictive and predictive confir
mation. The more general is confirmed by the more specific. "All
swans are white" is confirmed by the next swan; "All sundogs are
formed in conditions C" is confirmed by the next set of conditions
and the next sundog; "God loves me" is confirmed by the love of
my Christian brothers and sisters empowered by the Holy Spirit.
Second, could we ever validate theistic practice? It was men
tioned early in Chapter 10 that, perhaps when one confirms a suffi
cient number of beliefs delivered by a given practice, the practice is
then validated. This suggestion seems to rely on predictive confir
mation, for it seems clear enough that what connects the confirm
ing instances and the validation of the practice is an inductive argu
ment that relies on the regularity of the objects about which the
beliefs are formed. This is not unlike Alston's appeal to the induc
tive subargument in his overall justificatory argument for a belief
in the reliability of a doxastic practice. Induction, resting as it does
on our trust in the regularity of nature, provides grounds for the
move from confirming instances to validation only if the principle
of induction is assumed (practically, at least) within the practice.
If this model for the relationship between validation and confir
mation is correct, then insofar as nonpredictive, comportment con
firmations do not rest on the regularity of nature the inductive in
ference is not possible. We could never have validation of a theistic
practice, at least if that validation rests on predictive confirmation.
This aligns well with Alston's claim that, if we discovered that
God was dealing with us in a predictable fashion, we would have
evidence that the theistic practice is unreliable. To expect valida
tion of this type is to expect too much. Perhaps we must be satis
fied with nonpredictive confirmation of individual beliefs or per
haps, for many of us, no confirmation whatsoever.
But this is not to say that there is no nontrivial self-support pro
vided for CP. Is there another model for understanding the rela
tionship between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of
practices? I believe so. On the comportment understanding of con
firmation, if beliefs and experience fit together well, they are con
firmed. One of the beliefs that fits with the rest of the beliefs in a
theistic noetic structure is that, although God does not reveal him-
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self on demand, he does love us and will provide enough informa
tion to allow us to become committed to him. The confirmation I
have of certain theistic beliefs occurs when those beliefs are taken
together with my entire set of beliefs and experiences. The practice
that allows me to move from experience to theistic belief-CP,
exaggerated CP, or whatever other practice-is "validated, " in this
case shown to be rational, within the broader system of beliefs and
experience. I can judge beliefs generated by a practice to be reliable
because the belief that it is reliable comports well with my entire
(or at least a large part of my) noetic structure; there is nontrivial
self-support for the practice. This comportment is exemplified in
particular by the relationship between the belief about the reliable
nature of the theistic practice and the belief that God loves me and
will provide sufficient information for me to commit myself to
him.
This is circular but not, I think, in a surprising way. As Alston
suggests, our epistemic practices are basic practices. We should
not, therefore, hope for a noncircular type of confirmation.
Unique person practice and CP seem to be just such circular prac
tices. Since we have no other access to the objects about which we
form beliefs besides the practices that generate the beliefs, we can
not appeal to outside, independent information as a source of con
firmation.
So, just as the only access we have to the physical world is
through perception, perhaps at the end of the day the only access
we have to God is through the practice that generates theistic be
liefs. Thus the range of practices from PP through unique person
practice and CP are nontrivially self-supported. The confirmation
of their deliverances relies on the practices that form them, and in
turn the validation of the practices themselves-their rationality
relies on the confirmation (predictive or nonpredictive) of the be
liefs generated by them. The confirmation challenger might argue
that we could have access to theistic beliefs by using a discursive
belief-forming practice (natural theology) and that this is what
should validate the practice of forming theistic beliefs. But given
the lack of success with natural theology (comparable to the lack of
success in epistemology with confirming perception's deliverances
by reasoning from beliefs about sensations, or from sensations
themselves, to beliefs about the external, physical world), it hardly
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seems likely that we should turn there to show the rationality of
the practice or, by extension, confirmation of beliefs. Furthermore,
discursive reasoning is no less a basic practice, on Alston's terms.
Whatever one demands of beliefs about God, one should de
mand no more of them than that demanded of unique person prac
tice beliefs. Confirmation and validation of an independent, non
circular variety is not available for either unique person practice or
CP beliefs. Since an independent check is not available, one should
anticipate a kind of circularity in their confirmation. So, there is or
can be as much link between basic CP beliefs and other informa
tion (which makes the theistic beliefs likely to be true, or at least
our taking them as such to be rational) as there is between unique
person practice beliefs and other information (which makes unique
person practice beliefs likely to be true, or our taking them as such
to be rational). In either case, the beliefs can be properly basic or
immediately justified: their practices can have rationality and that
at the same level. Thus the requirement that theistic beliefs be con
firmed and theistic practices validated in the sense that confirma
tion requires predictive regularity is overly strong. The demand
assumes that regularity of the object of belief is a necessary feature
for confirmation of belief. In turn, this assumes that justified beliefs
can only be formed about objects for which regular, predictive
confirmation is possible. But what is necessary for justification is
not regularity but trustworthiness or reliability. Alston provides an
account of how a practice can be reliable without having a regular
object behind it. I have attempted to provide an extension of his
account, suggesting that confirmation of some beliefs about non
regular objects may occur. Whether a given belief about a non
regular object is confirmed is an empirical question to be answered
by whether one has the appropriate experiences and forms the
needed beliefs.
I have suggested a new parity thesis between CP and unique
person practice. I have also suggested a sketch of how the begin
nings of a holistic framework for a defense of PTN could go, along
with a defense of PTN against two potential criticisms. In the final
chapter I suggest another holistic principle in which Christian be
liefs may find justification, and I provide a summary of the book's
argument.

